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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LOUISE A. DRAZICH, aka LOUISE
ANN DRAZICH, as an individual, and
LOUISE A. DRAZICH, as Trustee of
the Will of MARKO N. DRAZICH,
deceased,

CASE NO. 970333-CA

Plaintiffs/Appellants
District Court Case No. 940906967
ALAN LASSON, MARY D. WHITE,
And DARRELL L. WHITE, individuals,
Defendants/Appellee

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:
In this Brief, "T" refers to the transcript of the proceedings from trial. There are three
volumes of transcript. "Tl" refers to volume one, "T2" refers to volume two, and "T3" refers to
volume three. "R" refers to the Record of the District Court, and "Ex" refers to an exhibit,
followed by the exhibit number.
Defendants Mary D. White, Darrell L. White and David A. White are no longer parties in
this action.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION:
Appellee adopts by this reference the Appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction appearing on
page 1 of Appellants' Brief.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW:

ISSUE ONE:
IN A QUIET TITLE ACTION, DOES THE PLAINTIFF HAVE
THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE VALIDITY OF ITS TITLE?

Standards for Review:
(1) On appeal the appellate court will not upset the trial court's findings and judgment
unless the evidence were such that all reasonable minds must necessarily so find, and
the appellate court will review evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly to be
drawn therefrom in the light favorable to the trial court's findings and judgment.
Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corporation v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating
Co.. 909 P.2d 225,228 (Utah 1996); Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Company.
511 P.2d 145,146 (Utah 1973); Lamkin v. Lynch. 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979).
(2) A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed for correctness and
therefore no deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law. State v.
Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City
Ca, 870 P.2d 932 (Utah 1993).
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ISSUE TWO:
DOES A CONVEYANCE TO A RAILROAD COMPANY OF
AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY FOR USE AS A
RAILROAD SPUR LINE CONSTITUTE A CONVEYANCE
OF A FEE SIMPLE INTEREST OR MERELY AN EASEMENT,
SUBJECT TO ABANDONMENT, WHERE THE LOCATION OF
THE REAL PROPERTY IS NOT DEFINED IN THE CONVEYANCE?
Standards for Review:
See standards for Issue One above.

ISSUE THREE:
DOES A "STRAY" OR "WILD" DEED WHICH DOES NOT CREATE OR
CONVEY A VALID INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY CREATE
A "TITLE TRANSACTION" SUFFICIENT TO ELIMINATE
MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT PROTECTIONS?
Standards for Review:
See standards for Issue One above.
ISSUE FOUR:
IN APPELLANTS' BRIEF, IS THE INCLUSION OF ISSUES
NOT FOUND IN THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW OR JUDGMENT APPROPRIATE TO BE CONSIDERED
BY THE APPELLATE COURT, OR IS SUCH INCLUSION A
VIOLATION OF RULE 24 Q) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE?
Standards for Review:
Under the Utah Constitution, the appellate court has rule making power, and
primary responsibility to promulgate and enforce rules relating to the practice of
law. Utah Constitution.. Art. VIII, Section 4; Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229,
1237 (Utah 1992).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES:
QUIET TITLE ACTION STATUTE
78-40-1 Utah Code Annotated. SEE APPELLEE'S ADDENDUM
"Action to determine adverse claim to property—authorized."

MARKETABLE TITLE ACT STATUTES
57-9-1 Utah Code Annotated. SEE APPELLANTS'ADDENDUM
"What constitutes marketable record title."
57-9-2 Utah Code Annotated. SEE APPELLANTS'ADDENDUM
"Right and interests to which marketable record title is subject."
57-9-3 Utah Code Annotated. SEE APPELLANTS' ADDENDUM
"Marketable record title held free and clear of interests, claims and charges."
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Section 4. SEE APPELLEE'S ADDENDUM
Rule 24 (j), Utah Rules ofAppellate Procedure. SEE APPELLEE'S ADDENDUM

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE:
This action was originally brought as a quiet title action by Appellants Drazich
(hereinafter "Drazich") to resolve a dispute over ownership of a parcel of land approximately 78
feet in length and of varying widths of approximately 11 to 22 feet. The area in dispute
(hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property") forms a portion of the north boundary of lands
claimed by Drazich and the south boundary of the Lasson land. The legal descriptions in their
current deeds of conveyance overlap.
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Drazich claims an interest in the Subject Property on the basis of an 1882 Indenture
granted to the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company (the "Railroad") which allowed
the Railroad to use certain property as part of its rail system in Salt Lake County, over which a
spur track was maintained until 1904, at which time the track was removed and the Railroad
ceased paying taxes on the property.
On or about September 3, 1958, the Railroad issued a special warranty deed to Building
Supply Center, which deed was conditioned upon and made subject to existing fence lines and
other competing interests found on the property. By mesne deeds of record, Drazich claims an
interest in the Subject Property.
Lasson claims his interest in the Subject Property from a chain of title dating back to a
homestead patent issued to James Bell in 1875. The present legal description of the Lasson
parcel has been used consistently by Salt Lake County taxing authorities since 1927 and appears
in mesne deeds of record since 1951 down to the 1993 warranty deed to Lasson.
The issues at trial included the Utah Marketable Record Title Act, adverse possession,
boundary by acquiescence, and trespass. The trial court's ruling deals solely with the issues
relating to the Marketable Record Title Act protection of the Lasson title, which issues include
Lasson's unbroken chain of title, the nature of the original interest conveyed to the Railroad, the
acts of abandonment by the Railroad, and the validity and effect of the 1958 deed from the
Railroad to Building Supply Center under which Drazich claims an interest in the Subject
Property.
Since the trial court made no ruling on the issues of adverse possession and boundary by
acquiescence, those issues are not properly before this Court and will not be argued in this Brief
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B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS:
This case was tried without jury before the Honorable William B. Bohling in the Third
District Court for Salt Lake County, in September and November, 1996.
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT.
The respective parties submitted proposed findings and conclusions, and the court took
the matter under advisement. The court ruled that Lasson had acquired title to the Subject
Property and that the Lasson Title was protected under the Marketable Record Title Act

The

court adopted the findings and conclusions of the defendant Lasson. A Judgment and Order,
dated January 3, 1997, was signed and entered by the court. No post-judgment motions relating
directly to the case were made, and the judgment by the court is a final judgment for purposes of
this case and this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Lasson acquired title to his property by a warranty deed dated October 25, 1993. (Ex
3-P).
2. Drazich obtained a warranty deed to his property in December 1993. (Ex 1-P).
3. The description contained in the deed to Drazich overlaps and extends into the Lasson
property to the extent of approximately 22 feet at the easterly end and 11 feet at the westerly end,
for an average width of approximately 15 feet. The precise description of said overlap is not
identified by a metes and bounds description.
4. Title to the area in dispute has a common origin of title by virtue of a Patent issued by
the United States Government to James Bell. (Ex 15-P).
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5. The Patentee, James Bell, conveyed fee title to Abraham Helm by a certain
"Indenture" recorded in Book L, page 283-284 in the official records of Salt Lake County. (Ex
15-P).
6. Abraham Helm, by a certain "Indenture" dated August 29, 1882, conveyed to The
Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company (the "Railroad") an interest in a strip of land which
extended from the main line of the Railroad's tracks, in a northeasterly direction, over and across
the lands owned by Helm. The description contained in said Indenture describes the lands to
which the interest related as being a corridor two rods (33 feet) in width, lying 16 lA feet on
either side of the center line of an existing railroad track. The actual location of the Railroad's
track is not described in the Indenture. (Ex 17-D). The transaction between Helm and the
Railroad was a private transaction. No condemnation or government grants were involved in the
conveyance to the Railroad. (Ex 17-D)
7. The railroad tracks lying within the corridor were removed in approximately 1904,
and no precise legal description of the location of the tracks or of the corridor in which the tracks
were located was ever recorded.

Credible evidence at trial demonstrated considerable

discrepancy and confusion as to the exact location of the Railroad's tracks. (Ex 5-P; Tl at 66-69;
T2 at 15-22).
8. The Railroad ceased paying taxes on the corridor lands in 1904 (Tl at 152-153; Ex
22-D and 23-D), ceased using the land for railroad purposes at that time, and commenced quit
claiming its interest in the corridor lands as early as 1926 (Tl at 150; Ex 21-D).
9. In 1958, the Railroad employed Coon and King Engineers ("Coon and King') to
attempt to survey the corridor of land upon which the tracks had existed and to establish a legal
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description for the corridor which had been imprecisely described in the 1882 Indenture. (Ex 12D).
10. The survey prepared by Coon and King revealed the existence and location of a fence
lying several feet south of what Coon and King believed to be the northerly boundary of the
historic railroad right-of-way. (Ex 12-D). No clear evidence was presented at trial demonstrating
that the Coon and King survey accurately reflected the historic location of the Railroad's tracks
or the corridor through which they traveled. (Tl at 66-69; T2 at 15-22). The location of the
fence and evidence of its long-term existence evidences that the fence may have been built along
the northerly boundary of the Railroad's right-of-way. (R at 234; Ex 19-D and 20-D).
11. Based solely upon the Coon and King Survey, on September 3, 1958, the Railroad
issued a special warranty deed to Building Supply Center, which was recorded in the official
records of Salt Lake County on November 26, 1958. (Ex 2-P). The legal description contained
in the special warranty deed includes the Subject Property.
12. The special warranty deed contained exceptions and conditions, one of which being
the "...outstanding rights for any and all...fences...now existing upon, under, along, over or
across the described premises." (Ex 2-P).
13. The legal description contained in the Drazich deed dated December, 1993, contained
that portion of the land described in the 1958 special warranty deed which is in dispute in this
case. (Ex 1-P).
14. The legal description contained in Lasson's warranty deed dated October 25, 1993
(Ex 3-P), which was recorded approximately two (2) months earlier than the Drazich deed (Ex 1P) also covers the entire area in dispute, and said legal description has been consistently and
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continuously used in taxing the Lasson property since 1926 (Tl at 155-156;Ex 24-D) and in
conveyances of the Lasson property since at least 1951. (Tl at 158;Ex 8-P).
15. Both Lasson and Drazich claim title to the Subject Property.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:
APPELATE REVIEW OF CIVIL ACTIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED
TO QUESTIONS OF LAW AND NOT OF FACT, AND THE PLAINTIFF
(APPELLANTS DRAZICH) HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN
QUIET TITLE ACTIONS
During the course of the trial both sides presented evidence and testimony in support of
their respective positions, with the plaintiff, Drazich, being required to shoulder the burden of
proof By law, the District Court is the trier of fact and great deference should be given by this
Court to the factual determinations made by the District Court. Based upon the facts presented
and adopted by the District Court, the conclusions of law issued by the District Court are well
founded and should be upheld.
POINT II:
AN INTERST IN REAL PROPERTY CONVEYED TO A RAILROAD
FOR RAILROAD PURPOSES, WHICH DOES NOT IDENTIFY THE
LAND TO BE USED, MUST BE DEEMED AN EASEMENT, SUBJECT
TO ABANDONMENT, AND NOT A FEE SIMPLE INTEREST.
Regardless of the language contained in an instrument purporting to convey an interest in
real property, if the instrument fails to adequately describe the property which it purports to
convey, and the nature of the use to which the property is put is consistent with a right-of-way or
easement, the conveyance will be deemed as a matter of law a conveyance of a right-of-way or
easement, subject to abandonment. The actions and inactions of the Railroad demonstrate that it
viewed the conveyance as that of a right-of-way or easement and that it intended to and in fact
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did abandon its property interest prior to 1958. Once the interest is abandoned, it cannot be
revived.
POINT III:
A "STRAY" OR "WILD" DEED WHICH DOES NOT CONVEY AN
EXISTING AND VALID INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY CANNOT
HAVE THE EFFECT OF ELIMINATING THE PROTECTIONS OF
THE UTAH MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT.
The Marketable Record Title Act is clear that the protections afforded thereunder are not
affected by a "stray" or "wild" deed which does not convey an existing and valid interest, such as
the 1958 deed to Building Supply Center. Similarly, the protections of the Marketable Record
Title Act are not adversely affected by a deed which, by its terms, recognizes the superior title
interests of others.
POINT IV:
THE ISSUES OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AND BOUNDARY
BY ACQUIESCENCE ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
The District Court's ruling in favor of Lasson was based solely upon issues relating
directly to Lasson's Marketable Record Title Act protections. The issues of adverse possession
and boundary by acquiescence were and are immaterial to the District Court's findings and
judgment and this appeal. Drazich's attempts to argue these points clouds the issue before this
Court and is in direct violation of Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
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ARGUMENT
I.
APPELLATE REVIEW OF CIVIL ACTIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED
TO QUESTIONS OF LAW AND NOT OF FACT, AND THE PLAINTIFF
(APPELLANTS DRAZICH) HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN
QUIET TITLE ACTIONS.
It is clear in Utah as in most jurisdictions that the scope of appellate review of civil
actions is focused on the law applied by the trial court and not on the credible facts upon which
the trial court makes its decision. See Zions First National Bank v. First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A.. 534 P.2d 900, 902 (Utah 1975); Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co.. 511 P.2d
145,146 (Utah 1973). Only under the circumstances where the facts relied upon by the trial court
are "clearly erroneous" will the appellate court review those facts.

In the case of Butler,

Crockett and Walsh Development Corp, supra,, at 228, Justice Zimmerman, speaking for the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
We begin by noting the standard of review in this almost exclusively factual case.
We reverse a trail court's findings of fact only if they are 'against the clear weight
of the evidence,' In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (quoting State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). In making such a determination, we
consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's finding, and we
recite the facts in accordance with that standard. Van Dyke v. Chappel, 818 P.2d
1023, 1024 (Utah 1991).
As will be discussed hereafter, the facts (or lack thereof) presented at trial by Drazich mandated
the decision made by the District Court in favor of Lasson.
In bringing this quiet title action, Drazich had the burden of proving that its chain of title
was superior to that of Lasson, and it utterly failed to do so. (See Olseru supra., at 146, and
Colman v. Butkovich, 538 P.2d 188 (Utah 1975)). In order to demonstrate superior chain of
title, Drazich had to prove at trial (1) that the conveyance to the Railroad was a conveyance of a
valid and continuing fee simple interest in the Subject Property and (2) that the 1958 deed from
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the Railroad to Building Supply Center conveyed a valid interest in the Subject Property. As
will be discussed below, Drazich presented no credible evidence demonstrating that the 1882
Indenture to the Railroad contained a legal description of the property purportedly conveyed to
the Railroad sufficient to meet the requirements of a fee simple conveyance. Further, as will be
discussed below, Drazich presented no evidence refuting Lasson's evidence that the Railroad
abandoned whatever interests it may have had in the Subject property by, at the latest, 1926.
Drazich also failed to provide evidence that the exceptions and conditions shown on the 1958
Coon and King survey and described in the 1958 deed from the Railroad to Building Supply
Center did not exempt out the Subject Property.
In short, Drazich failed to prove to the satisfaction of the trier of fact that any valid or
continuing interest in the Subject Property was conveyed to it or its predecessors in interest.
Without such proof, the 1958 deed, upon which Drazich relies for its root of title (which has an
age less than the forty (40) years required under the Utah Marketable Record Title Act), is totally
without legal effect under the plain language of the Utah Marketable Record Title Act and Utah
property law generally. (See Section 57-9-1, Utah Code Annotated; Olsen, supra., at 147-148).
The District Court found that Drazich did not meet its burden of proof based on the facts
(or lack thereof) presented at trial, and this determination by the District Court should be upheld
in accordance with the standards of review long established by this Court and the Utah Supreme
Court.
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II.
AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY CONVEYED TO A RAILROAD
FOR RAILROAD PURPOSES, WHICH DOES NOT IDENTIFY THE LAND
TO BE USED, MUST BE DEEMED AN EASEMENT, SUBJECT TO
ABANDONMENT, AND NOT A FEE SIMPLE INTEREST.
In its Brief, Drazich argues that the fact that the 1882 Indenture in favor of the Railroad
contained "grant, bargain and sale" and "fee" language should be determinative of the issue of
whether the conveyance is one of a fee simple interest in property or merely an easement, subject
to abandonment. In support of this position, Drazich refers the Court to rather ancient case law,
none of which is directly applicable to the case at bar.
In each of the cases cited by Drazich, the courts had the benefit of an instrument that not
only contained "grant, bargain and sale" language but also had an understandable and locatable
legal description of the property being conveyed. By contrast, in this case the Court is dealing
with an Indenture that does not contain a precise or locatable legal description of the Railroad
property. Drazich's expert title witness, Gary Carlson ("Carlson") testified at trial that the legal
description contained in the Indenture was "very ambiguous." (Tl at 93). Drazich's expert
witness, Jack L. DeMass ("DeMass") testified at trial that neither the 1882 Indenture nor the
1910 Railroad Affidavit (the "Affidavit") (Ex P-5) contained a legal description or drawing that
could be physically tied to any point on the ground. (Tl at 66-69). Similarly, Lasson's expert
witness, M. Carl Larsen ("Larsen"), testified at trial that based upon his review of and extensive
research concerning the Indenture and the Affidavit, no location of the spur line could or can be
determined. (T2 at 15-22). No credible evidence was presented at trial that even the Railroad or
its surveyor knew where the spur line was actually located. No one was called at trial to testify
on behalf of Coon and King, the Railroad's surveyor, as to how its survey was prepared. In fact,
DeMass, Drazich's expert surveyor witness, testified that he could not determine from his review

13

of the Coon and King Survey what data, if any, Coon and King used to attempt to relocate the
Railroad spur in 1958. (Tl at 66-69).
In a remarkably similar case in the State of Washington, in which a county was
attempting to claim ownership of property which had been originally described in an ancient
deed as being "...20 feet on each side of line of said road as surveyed...," the Washington Court
of Appeals ruled that the legal description of the property contained in the deed was insufficient
because there was no reference in the deed to a specific survey and because there was evidence
presented at trial that a surveyor could not precisely locate the property given the description
contained in the deed. In making this ruling, the Appeals Court stated:
Deeds must contain an adequate legal description of the real property to be
conveyed (Citations omitted). An inadequate legal description is a violation of
the statute of frauds (Citations omitted). No reference was made to a specific
survey and there was evidence a surveyor could not locate the property, given the
description contained in the deed. The cases cited by the County are not
dispositive as they hold specific reference to the second document must be made
within the deed.
Sparks v. Douglas County. 695 P.2d 588, 589 (Wash. App. 1985).
Other modern case law holds that an instrument purporting to create an interest in real
property which fails to provide an adequate legal description of the property which it purports to
convey is either (a) invalid on its face (see Colman. supra, at 189), or (b) conveys an easement
rather than a full possessory interest. (See Fetzer v. Cities Service Oil Co.. 572 Fed.2d 1250 (8th
Cir. 1978) (lack of clarity in land description may indicate the conveyance of an easement rather
than a full possessory interest); Hutson et al. v. The Agricultural Ditch and Reservoir Co., 723
P.2d 736 (Colo. 1986) (a document purporting to convey a fee interest must at least provide a
means of identifying the property conveyed); Sherman et al. v. Petroleum Exploration et al., 132
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SW.2d 768, 770 (Ky. 1939) (imprecise description creates an easement only, even though
warranty language is used in the conveying instrument)).
Clearly, neither the Indenture itself nor the Affidavit provides the clarity necessary to
create a fee simple interest in the Railroad. In Colman, supra, at 189, the Utah Supreme Court
held that "[u]nder no circumstances can [an] affidavit initiate title.... It is neither a conveyance
nor a transfer of marketable title in any sense of the word—statutory or otherwise."
By the admission of Drazich's own expert surveyor witness, the actual location of the
spur line cannot at this date be determined (Tl at 66-69), and there was no credible evidence
presented at trial demonstrating that the Coon and King Survey upon which Drazich's alleged
root of title is based was in fact correct. (Tl at 66-69). By contrast, there was significant
testimony and evidence given at trial by Lasson's expert surveyor witness, Larsen, to the effect
that it is more likely than not that the spur track was moved to a position south of its original line
sometime before the track was removed in 1904. (T2 at 21). This is a key element in this Case
since the location of the Railroad's property interest under the original Indenture was tied
directly to the centerline of the tracks. (Ex 7-P). The possible, and according to Larsen probable,
relocation of the tracks prior to 1904 makes the "legal description" found in the 1882 Indenture
even more ambiguous and confusing.

Drazich introduced no evidence or testimony at trial

refuting (or even responding to) this important point.
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court was justified in determining that
the location of the Railroad spur cannot be accurately or adequately determined. Without such
location, the law requires that the Indenture be interpreted as either being void on its face, or at
the most as creating an easement, subject to abandonment, but certainly not a fee simple interest.
(See Colman, supra.; Fetzer, supra.; Hutson, supra.; and Sherman, supra).
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Equally as troubling to Drazich's case at trial were the uncontested facts surrounding the
Railroad's own statements and actions relative to the property interest conveyed in the Indenture.
The Affidavit (Ex 5-P) refers to the interest conveyed to the Railroad as a "right-of-way" (not fee
simple) and indicates (a) that the track was removed in 1904 and (b) that the right-of-way had
not been abandoned as of 1910. Why would the Railroad have been so concerned about the
possibility of abandonment if in fact it thought it owned a fee simple interest?

Further

uncontested evidence of abandonment was introduced at trial to the effect that the Railroad
ceased paying taxes on the right-of-way in 1904 (Ex 22-D and 23-D; Tl at 154) and began quit
claiming its interest in the spur line property as early as 1926 (Ex 21-D; Tl at 150), thus making
continued use of the property by the Railroad impossible.

The Railroad's own records,

memoranda, and correspondence surrounding the 1958 Coon and King Survey and the 1958 deed
to Building Supply Center indicate that the Railroad was not sure what it owned (if anything) (Ex
18-D) and therefore was not willing to warrant any property within existing fence lines to
Building Supply Center, Drazich's predecessor in interest. (Ex 2-P).
The District Court properly took all of these factors into account in determining that the
interest conveyed to the Railroad was in fact an easement, subject to abandonment, and that the
Railroad had in fact abandoned the easement prior to 1958. (R at 235-236).

III.
A "STRAY" OR "WILD" DEED WHICH DOES NOT CONVEY AN
EXISTING AND VALID INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY
CANNOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF ELIMINATING THE PROTECTIONS
OF THE UTAH MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT.
It was uncontested at trial that Lasson has an unbroken chain of title to his property which
has existed in excess of forty (40) years, thus making him eligible for protection under the Utah
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Marketable Record Title Act. (Section 57-9-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated (the "Act')). Section
57-9-2 of the Act sets forth certain exceptions to the effectiveness of the Act in protecting
property rights. The only exception at issue in this case appears in Section 57-9-2(4) of the Act
which reads as follows:
[The marketable record title is subject to] any interest out of a title transaction
which has been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title from
which the unbroken chain of title of record is started, except that the recording
does not revive or give validity to any interest which has been extinguished prior
to the time of the recording by the operation of Section 57-9-3. . . . (Emphasis
added).
As discussed in Section II above, no credible evidence was introduced at trial locating with any
precision the property in which the Railroad claimed an interest.

Uncontested evidence

presented at trial clearly showed action and inaction on the part of the Railroad demonstrating an
abandonment of any interest which it might have once claimed. Based on these two factors
alone, the District Court was justified in determining that "...[n]o 'title transaction,' as that term
is used in Section 5 7-9-2(4)... occurred so as to break Defendant's (Lasson's) chain of title..." (R
at 236).
An additional basis for the District Court's ruling is found in the facts and circumstances
surrounding the preparation of the 1958 deed to Building Supply Center (in which Drazich
claims his root of title to the Subject Property) and the language of the deed itself. As previously
discussed, inter-company letters and memoranda executed and delivered by the Railroad prior to
issuance of the 1958 deed indicated that the Railroad was unsure of the exact location of the
right-of-way (Ex 18-D; Tl at 104,106) and was concerned about the effect of a fence line shown
on a map prepared by the Railroad prior to the preparation of the Coon and King Survey (Ex 18D;T1 at 107-110).
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Prior to issuance of the 1958 deed and as a result of inter-company directions regarding
the sale to Building Supply Center, the Railroad retained the services of Coon and King to
provide what has been described as a "certified survey." (Tl at 105; Ex 12-P). Both of the expert
surveyor witnesses, DeMass and Larsen, testified that they could not verify the accuracy of the
Coon and King Survey as to the exact location of the Railroad's spur line (Tl at 66-67; T2 at 4849). Nevertheless, the unverified survey, when completed, showed a fence line running along
the south boundary of the existing Lasson and White properties. (T2 at 25-26; Ex 12-P).
After the Coon and King Survey was completed, the Railroad authorized the issuance of
a special warranty deed to Building Supply Center containing certain exceptions and conditions.
(Ex 18-D at p. 5). Specifically, the conveyance was made subject to (and did not contain
warranties as to) "...all outstanding rights for any and all...fences...existing upon ...the said
described premises." (Ex 2-P). Drazich argues in its Brief that since Building Supply Center
received a special warranty deed, this conveyance must be deemed a "title transaction"
disrupting Lasson's chain of title under the Act. This simply is not the case. Since the 1958
deed cannot be tied by evidence back to the 1882 Indenture or the 1910 Affidavit, the deed, by
definition, is a "stray" or "wild" deed. In reviewing Utah law relating to the effect of "stray"
deeds, Judge McKay, speaking for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
When , as here, the relevant state law is inconclusive and ambiguous on the effect
of a stray deed, we are not convinced that, as a matter of federal law, a party
should be considered so unreasonable in failing to have discovered the existence
of a claim that he will be charged with constructive knowledge of the claim. The
doctrine of constructive notice, which creates a fiction and deals with hypothetical
facts, is a harsh doctrine which should be resorted to reluctantly and construed
strictly (citations omitted).
Amoco Production Company v. United States, 619 F.2d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir. 1980).
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In the Amoco case, the court was dealing with the issue of constructive notice. Drazich
has argued that its "stray" deed is sufficient to destroy Lasson's protections under the Marketable
Record Title Act. Like Judge McKay and the Tenth Circuit, Lasson contends that such an
application of the ambiguous rulings of the Utah Courts in the past concerning "stray" deeds
would be "harsh doctrine" and violative of the oft stated and well established principal that
"...boundary lines which have long been established and accepted by those who should be
concerned should be left undisturbed in order to leave at rest matters which may have resulted in
controversy and litigation...." Oteen, supra., at 147.
This principal is particularly relevant in the case at bar for two reasons.

First, as

previously discussed, the "stray" deed cannot revive or give validity to an interest which was
extinguished prior to the effective date of the deed (Section 57-9-2(4)), and second, the
conveyance contained in the deed itself was specifically made "subject to" the rights of others
(including Lasson's predecessors) owning or claiming lands within the existing fence lines. It is
also interesting to note that during cross examination, Mr. Carlson, Drazich's expert title witness,
admitted that the "subject to" provisions raise ambiguities as to what was actually conveyed in
the 1958 deed. The relevant portions of that examination are as follows:
Q. And in the 1958 deed, the Special Warranty Deed which we
have discussed this morning, have you had an opportunity to
review that document?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And are you familiar with the conveyance language in that
document?
A. Yes.
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Q.

You are familiar with it? Fine. In the language conveying
subject to certain condition, what does that mean to you as a
title examiner?

A. Well, it means that there may or may not be something there.
Generally speaking, that universal-type language that's used
could mean there is something there and could mean there
isn't anything there.
Q.

So unless you study what's actually on the ground or what
parol evidence perhaps there is surrounding the deed, you
really wouldn't know what was conveyed in that instrument.
Is that correct?

A.

That's correct.

(Tl at 90-91).

Lasson's expert title witness, Arlen Taylor, agreed with Mr. Carlson and

indicated that such language in the deed negatively affects the insurability of the conveyance.
(Tl at 160). Thus both expert witnesses could not verify what, if anything, was conveyed to
Drazich's predecessor in interest by the 1958 deed.
Based upon the events and document surrounding the preparation of the Coon and King
Survey, the unverifiable Survey itself, the clear language of the deed to Building Supply Center,
and the testimony of the expert title witnesses at trial, the District Court was more than justified
in holding that no conveyance of the Subject Property occurred as a result of the 1958 deed and
that the deed did not constitute a "title transaction" sufficient to eliminate or lessen Lasson's
protections under the Act.
IV.
THE ISSUES OF ADVERSE POSSESION
AND BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
It is perfectly clear from the Record in this Case that the decision of the District Court in
favor of Lasson was based solely on protections afforded Lasson under the Utah Marketable
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Record Title Act. (R at 231-241). Although thoroughly briefed and argued at trial, the issues of
adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence were determined by the District Court to be
irrelevant and immaterial to the outcome of the case. (T3 at 41-43). Nevertheless, Drazich's
counsel has taken approximately twelve pages of his Brief to reargue these points. The inclusion
of these irrelevant and immaterial matters in the Appellant's Brief is in direct violation of Rule
24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states:
(j) Requirements and Sanctions. All briefs under this rule must
be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper
headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and
the court may assess attorney's fees against the offending lawyer.
(Emphasis added).
(See Appellee's Addendum).

Since the issues of adverse possession and boundary by

acquiescence were immaterial and irrelevant to the District Court's decision on this matter,
Lasson has elected not to respond in this Brief to the arguments on these issues contained in the
Drazich Brief. Should this Court desire to know of Lasson's position on these matters, the Court
is directed to the Trial Brief of Defendant Alan Lasson (R at 112-161) and the Closing Brief of
Defendant Alan Lasson (R at 201-215).
Further, Lasson respectfully requests that this Court impose appropriate sanctions upon
Drazich's counsel for including these immaterial and irrelevant matters in his Brief by (1)
striking the irrelevant and immaterial portion of the Appellants' Brief, (2) granting Lasson costs
and attorney's fees incurred by Lasson in this appellate proceeding, and (3) granting such other
relief as the Court may find appropriate in the premises.
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CONCLUSION
This case was originally brought by Drazich to attempt to quiet title to the Subject
Property which it believed it owned by virtue of a 1958 deed granted to its predecessor in interest
by the Railroad. As the moving party in this action, Drazich had the burden of proving (1) that
the Railroad at some point acquired a fee simple interest in the Subject Property, (2) that the
property used by the Railroad could and can be accurately located, (3) that the Railroad did not
abandon or otherwise forfeit its interest in the Subject Property prior to 1958, (4) that the fence
line exceptions found on the 1958 Coon and King Survey and in the 1958 deed did not recognize
the validity of the rights of other owners of property lying within said fence lines, and (5) that in
all respects the 1958 deed accurately described and ties directly back to a portion of the property
originally used by the Railroad. We submit that Drazich failed at trial to meet its burden of proof
on all of these issues.
The evidence presented at trial clearly indicates that the original location of the
Railroad's spur line cannot be determined, and therefore it is impossible to determine whether in
fact the 1958 deed that created the overlap is accurate. The one thing that was clear at trial, and
the fact upon which the District Court relied in reaching its decision on this matter, was that
Lasson and his predecessors in interest held title to the entirety of the Lasson property from
1927, according to the County tax rolls (Tl at 157; Ex 24-D), and since at least 1951, according
to deeds of record. (Tl at 157; Ex 8-P). Thus Lasson has and enjoys the protections of the Utah
Marketable Record Title Act, which the unsubstantiated and unverifiable deed upon which
Drazich relies for his root of title simply cannot affect.
In discussing the burden of proof of a plaintiff in a quiet title action, Chief Justice
Henroid stated: "[o]ne cannot prevail on the weakness of his adversary's title, but only on the
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strength of his own." Colman v. Butkovich. 538 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1975). The District Court
was more than justified in ruling in favor of Lasson based on the lack of evidence presented at
trial by Drazich in support of its claim to title.
Therefore, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed and costs and attorney
fees of this appeal should be awarded to Appellee Lasson for the reasons herein stated.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this * T - day of October, 1997.

DAVID P. HIRSCHI
Attorney for Appellee Alan Lasson
2224 North 640 West
West Bountiful, Utah 84087
(801) 296-1420
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This is to certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief were
mailed, postage prepaid, to Brant H. Wall and Gregory B. Wall, attorneys for appellants Drazich,
at Suite 800, Boston Building, 9 East Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, on the
day of October, 1997.

DA
Attorney at Law
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ADDENDUM

STATUTE
Section 78-40-1 Utah Code Annotated
CONSTITUTION
Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Section 4
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Rule 24(j), Utah Rules ofAppellate Procedure

QUIET TITLE
Section
78-40-12.
78-40-13.

78-40-1
must require evidence — Conclusiveness of judgment.

Service of summons and conclusiveness of judgment.
Judgment on default — Court

78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim to property —
Authorized.
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an
estate or interest in real property or an interest or claim to personal property
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-40-1.
Cross-References. — Action brought in
county where property situated, § 78-13-1.
Allowance for improvements made under

color of title, §§ 57-6-1 et seq., § 78-40-5.
Jurisdiction in district courts, Utah Const.,
Art. VIII, Sec. 5; § 78-3-4.
Limitations of actions, § 78-12-1 et seq.
Tax sales of real property, § 59-2-1303 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adverse possession.
Due process.
Heirs.
Judgment.
Nature and scope of proceedings.
Option to purchase.
Presumptions and burden of proof.
Proof of claim.
Tax titles or claims.
Water rights.
What claims may be assailed.
What constitutes "claim" of "estate or interest."
Wrongful possession.
Adverse possession.
One claiming by adverse possession does not
arrest the running of this section in his favor by
commencing an action to quiet title. Welner v.
Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 P. 490, 1914C Ann.
Cas. 1175 (1911).
Due process.
Repossession of real property under a contract and the quiet title procedure did not
constitute state action under the fourteenth
amendment, thereby giving the vendees a right
to reasonable notice prior to the destruction of
their security interest, where the state did not
create the n g h t s leading to the vendees' deprivation of their interest m the contract. Dirks v.
Goodwill, 754 P.2d 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Heirs.
Heirs could bring action to quiet title though
there had been no adjudication of heirship.
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P.2d
355 (1934).
Judgment.
Court of equity, in an action to quiet title,

may not only enter judgment quieting title, but
may mclude in the judgment a general order
restraining the defendant from asserting any
claim adverse to, and in derogation of, the
plaintiff's right, and may prohibit the defendant from doing any act that would tend to
impair or destroy such right. Richey v. Beus, 31
U t a h 262, 87 P. 903 (1906).
Decree in an action to quiet title can only
bind the parties to the action. Fisher v. Davis,
77 Utah 81, 291 P. 493 (1930).
Effect of a decree quieting title is not to vest
title, but to perfect an existing title as against
other claimants. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't
of Social Servs. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335 (Utah
1979).
N a t u r e and s c o p e of proceedings.
The language used in this section is very
comprehensive. In terms, it authorizes an action by any person against another who claims
an estate or interest m real property adverse to
him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim. Bullion, Beck & Champion Mining
Co. v. Eureka Hill Mining Co., 5 Utah 3, 11 P.
515 (1886), appeal dismissed, 131 U.S. 431, 9 S.
Ct. 796, 33 L. Ed. 224 (1888).
Action to quiet title is an action at law and
thus either side, upon request, is entitled to a
jury trial. Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327
P.2d 250 (1958).
Statutory action to quiet title is an action in
rem, or quasi in rem, requiring either a state or
federal court to obtain jurisdiction over the
property in dispute before proceeding to adjudication on the merits. 1st Nat'l Credit Corp. v.
Von Hake, 511 F. Supp. 634 (D. Utah 1981).
Option to p u r c h a s e .
Validly exercised option to purchase cannot
fail for the reason t h a t funds are secured from
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Art VIII, § 4

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

are presumed to be proper unless there is no
substantial evidence to sustain them Schad v
Turner, 27 Utah 2d 345, 496 P 2d 263 (1972),
Wilson v Turner, 27 U t a h 2d 368, 496 P 2d
711 (1972), Leggroan v Turner, 27 Utah 2d
403, 497 P 2 d 17 (1972), Zumbrunnen v
Turner, 27 U t a h 2d 428, 497 P 2d 34 (1972)

Legislative enlargement or abridgement of
powers.
The powers given court by this provision
cannot be enlarged or abridged by the legislature State ex rel Robinson v Durand, 36 Utah
93, 104 P 760 (1908)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law — Judi
cial Socialization An Empirical Study, 11 J
Contemp L 423 (1985)

Key Numbers. — Courts <&=» 248

Sec, 4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court — Judges
pro tempore — Regulation of practice of law.]
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used
m the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process The
Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law m Utah The
Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission
to practice lawT and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice
law
History Const 1896, L. 1984 (2nd S S ) ,
S.JR. 1
Compiler's N o t e s — Former Article VIII
contained no comparable provisions

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Supreme Court rulemaking process Rule 11-101 Code of Judicial
Administration

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Judge pro tempore
Regulation of judicial conduct
Regulation of practice of lav,
Cited
J u d g e pro tempore.
Appointment of a judge pro tempore to hear
and decide a divorce action does not violate the
provisions of § 30-3-4, since a properly appointed pro tempore judge becomes the equal
m every respect to the regular judge Harward
v Harward, 526 P 2d 1183 (Utah 1974)
Circuit judge appointed by state court ad
ministrator to serve temporarily as a district
judge pursuant to § 78-3 24 and former
§ 78-4-15 was not a judge pro tempore and was
not subject to the legal restrictions pertaining
to t h a t status Cahoon v Cahoon, 641 P 2d 140
(Utah 1982)

Regulation of judicial conduct.
The Supreme Court is constitutionally obligated to review the Judicial Conduct Commission s proceedings, but the court has no authority to undertake initial review of matters related to compliance with the judicial canons of
ethics In re Greenwood, 135 U t a h Adv Rep
27 (1990)
Regulation of practice of law.
This section gives the Supreme Court the
power to govern the practice of law and to discipline bar members This power necessarily
includes control over the procedures used to
discipline bar members In re Crandall, 784
P 2 d 1193 (Utah 1989)
Cited m Stewart v Coffman, 748 P 2d 579
(Utah Ct App 1988)
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gale 23B. Motion to remand for d e t e r m i n a t i o n of ineffective a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l .
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a
criminal case may move the court to remand the case to the
trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact relevant
to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion shall
t>e available only upon an allegation of facts constituting
ineffective assistance of counsel not fully appearing in the
record on appeal. The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of
the appellant's brief. Upon a showing of good cause, the court
may permit a motion to be filed after the filing of the
appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to
be filed after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit
the court from remanding the case under this rule on its own
motion at any time if the claim has been raised and the motion
would have been available to a party.
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of
the motion shall conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The
motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging
facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the
claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits
shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered
by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. A response shall be filed within 20 days after the
motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed within 10 days after the
response is filed.
(c) Order of the court. Upon consideration of the motion,
affidavits, and memoranda, the court may order that the case
be temporarily remanded to the trial court for the purpose of
entering findings of fact relevant to the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. If it appears to the appellate court that
the attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest
upon remand, the court shall direct t h a t counsel withdraw
and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or
retained.
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for
briefs shall be vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand
under this rule. Other procedural steps required by these
rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, unless a stay
is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the
parties or upon the court's motion.
, (e) P r o c e e d i n g s before the trial court. Upon remand
the trial court shall conduct hearings and take evidence as
necessary to enter the findings of fact necessary to determine
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Evidentiary
hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as
practicable after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be
upon the proponent of the fact. The standard of proof shall be
a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall enter
written findings of fact.
(f) Preparation and transmittal of t h e record. At the
inclusion of all proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of
the trial court and the court reporter shall prepare the record
fifths supplemental proceedings as required by these rules. If
the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has
k e n transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial
^ u r t shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the supplemental record,
u the record of the original proceedings before the trial court
tas not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of
the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental
Proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record.
(g) Appellate court d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Upon receipt of the
record from the trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify
^ e parties of the new schedule for briefing or oral argument
^ d e r these rules. Errors claimed to have been made during
the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
^ e w a b l e under the same standards as the review of errors
^ other appeals. The findings of fact entered pursuant to this

R u l e 24

rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of
findings of fact in other appeals.
(Added effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of t h e a p p e l l a n t . The brief of the appellant shall
contain under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the
court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal
contains the names of all such parties. The list should be
set out on a separate page which appears immediately
inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the
addendum, with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically
arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and
other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the
brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the
appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review,
including for each issue: the standaid of appellate review
with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue
was preserved in the trial court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an
issue not preserved in the trial court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal
shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If
the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation
alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references
to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to
the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be: a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the
brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading
under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief
sought.
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no
addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so
makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or
regulation of central importance cited in the bnef but
not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of
the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court
opinion of central importance to the appeal but not
available to the court as part of a regularly published
reporter service; and
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(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of
(h) Briefs i n c a s e s i n v o l v i n g m u l t i p l e appellant*
central importance to the determination of the apa p p e l l e e s . In cases involving more than one appell an 4
peal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of n?
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision,
appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief a^j
the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part!*
contract or document subject to construction.
the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply britf
(b) B r i e f of t h e a p p e l l e e . The brief of the appellee shall
(i) C i t a t i o n of s u p p l e m e n t a l a u t h o r i t i e s . When n ^
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule,
nent and significant authorities come to the attention of
except that the appellee need not include:
party after that party's brief has been filed, or after
on]
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the
argument but before decision, a party may promptly advii*
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth th*
appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appelcitations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in th*
lant; or
Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall bt
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not infiled in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference eith*f
cluded in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which th#
may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument staU
(c) R e p l y brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to
the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall
the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has crossbe made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limits
appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response
(j) R e q u i r e m e n t s a n d s a n c t i o n s . All briefs under thii
of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal.
rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically tf»
Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set
ranged with proper headings and free from burdensome
forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, oa
(10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with
motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may asseif
leave of the appellate court.
attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(d) R e f e r e n c e s i n b r i e f s t o p a r t i e s . Counsel will be
(k) Brief c o v e r s . The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy
expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a
cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27.
minimum references to parties by such designations as "ap(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1,
pellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designa1995.)
tions used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or
the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the
R u l e 25. Brief of a n a m i c u s c u r i a e o r g u a r d i a n ad
employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
litem.
(e) R e f e r e n c e s i n b r i e f s t o t h e r e c o r d . References shall
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad litem
be made to the pages of the original record as paginated
representing a minor who is not a party to the appeal may bt
pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any statement of the
filed only if accompanied by written consent of all parties, Of
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuby leave of court granted on motion or at the request of tb#
ant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits shall be made
court. A motion for leave shall identify the interest of tbl
to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the
applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicul
admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable. Except as aU
made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae or guardian M
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
litem shall file its brief within the time allowed the party
(f) L e n g t h of b r i e f s . Except by permission of the court, whose position as to affirmance or reversal the amicus curi*#
or guardian ad litem will support, unless the court for cauH
principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs
shown otherwise orders. A motion of an amicus curiae Of
shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the
guardian ad litem to participate in the oral argument will &•
table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
granted when circumstances warrant in the court's discretion.
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the
record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases
R u l e 26. F i l i n g a n d s e r v i c e of b r i e f s .
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth
(a) T i m e for s e r v i c e a n d filing b r i e f s . Briefs shall. bf
the length of briefs.
deemed filed on the date of the postmark if first-class mail *
(g) Briefs i n c a s e s i n v o l v i n g c r o s s - a p p e a l s . If a crossutilized. The appellant shall serve and file a brief w i t h * V ?
appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be
days after date of notice from the clerk of the appellate w w
deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26,
pursuant to Rule 13, unless a motion for summary disposiw
unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise
of the appeal or a motion to remand for determination
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in
ineffective assistance of counsel has been previously tf*
length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain
posed,
in which event service and filing shall be within 3U «7
the issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well
from the denial of such motion. The appellee, or in c f*jj
as the answer to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed
involving a cross-appeal, the appellee/cross-appellant,
50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief which
serve and file a brief within 30 days after service o* .
contains an answer to the original issues raised by the
appellant's brief. In cases involving cross-appeals, the aP|*j£
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response
lant shall serve and file the second brief described m ^ ,
to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief. The
24(g) within 30 days after service of the appellee/cross-apPJ
appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 pages in length.
lant's brief. A reply brief may be served and filed %•-*
The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not
_ invohnflj
appellant or the appellee/cross-appellant in cases
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the
cross-appeals. If a reply brief is filed, it shall be serv
j^
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appelfiled within 30 days after the filing and service of ^^{JjJJj
lee/cross-appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by this
lee's brief or the appellant's second brief in cases i n
j$
rule are exclusive of table of contents, table of authorities, and
cross-appeals. If oral argument is scheduled fewer ^ ^ #
addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the court.
1
^
days iafter the filing of appellee's brief, the reply brief a fi*
The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause
latioo
filed
at
least
5
days
prior
to
oral
argument.
By
stipu
shown.

